This research has a twofold target. For one extent it embraces on a wider historical period previous analyzed related to the innovative bodies of law introduced by the Vietti's Reform in 2004, providing an overall evidence related to the Italian corporate system, ranging from consistency and dynamics of the different forms of legal entities, to their corporate governance and ownership structures. For another extent it proposes completely new data about other patterns of "Corporate Italy" which have never been enquired in a systematic way before. The paper provides a wide analysis of the ownership structures of unlisted joint stock Italian companies and of the limited liability companies describing the number of all the M&A deals or corporations' transformation or liquidation during 2012.
Introduction and related literature
The 2004 Vietti's Reform [1] introduced remarkable innovations in the body of the Italian Corporate Law, like alternative one tier and two tier systems of corporate governance for unlisted joint stock companies or the provision of specific bonds which may be issued by limited liability joint stock companies (article 2483 of the Civil Code).
Moreover the Reform allowed for joint stock companies further substantial innovations like the allowance for unlisted companies to entrust accounting auditing to an external auditor in non mandatory way (article 2409 bis of the Civil Code) or the duty to declare any sort of legal entities which are eventually in charge of a role of supervision and coordination of the corporate and business activities, according to the articles 2497 and following of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding this last institute was conceived for other purposes, it triggered the positive externality to allow scholars and practitioners to delve into the patterns and sizes of the Italian group of enterprises' phenomenon.
The introduction of these innovations represented the opportunity for a wider project of research encompassing both the analysis of stocks and dynamics of all the legal entities managing business activities and the monitoring of the widespread of the new institutes generated by the Vietti's Reform. This stream of studies which has been promoted by the Monitoring Committee [2] of the Chamber of Commerce of Milan with the data provided by the network of the Italian Chambers of Commerce, denominated Infocamere, represents a completely innovative field of research between law, economics and business studies. It has been supplied for the first time, at least in the Italian environment, a complete and fully detailed dataset and successively an historical series ranging since 2004 to 2012 of the main features of the Corporate Italy, regarding any sort of legal entities managing business activities, including the different typologies of no profit organizations (Bellavite Pellegrini 2006 Pellegrini , 2012 .
The aim of this study is at least twofold. For one extent it is intended to update the existing above mentioned historical series in order to monitor and explain the dynamics of the stocks of the Italian legal entities. The same target is pursued in relation to the different levels of implementation of the various institutes promoted by the Vietti's Reform [3] . However this study supplies additional evidences which were not available in the previously mentioned researches, providing the complete survey of the ownership's structures of the unlisted joint stock and limited liability Italian companies. Moreover for the same typology of legal entities the paper gives evidence of all the different typologies of corporate deals that occurred during 2012 in Italy. Law and Economics studies are likely to receive clear benefits from an accurate and meticulous knowledge of the stocks of legal entities managing business activities and their relative weight and a systematic information about the main distinguishing features of the mainly unlisted "Corporate Italy."
This research is organized in the following way. The second section describes the Italian companies stocks' time series since 2005, meanwhile the third section is dedicated to the time series of the eventual implementation by companies of the institutes introduced by the Reform. A specific focus will be devoted to the feasible reasons of success or failure of these institutes. The fourth and the fifth sections will deal the new data about the ownership's structures of the unlisted Italian joint stock and limited liability companies and about the different typologies of corporate deals which took place in 2012. The last paragraph will provide some concluding remarks.
Time series of Italian legal entities since 2005 [4]
We will take into analysis stocks and dynamics of joint stock companies and partnerships, focusing our attention separately on the two different categories. Successively we will dedicate our attention to the legal entities belonging to the cooperative world. All these evidences have as starting point on June 30 th 2005 . Table 1 provides data about the still existing [5] joint stock companies, partnerships and cooperatives. Table 2 shows respectively an increase of 38.23% and 1.96 times of stock of single shareholder joint stock and limited liability joint stock companies and a ratio on the total of the still existing companies of their specific category uprising respectively since 8.49% and 6.43% to the very similar percentage of 14.98% and 14.69%.
The opportunity of incorporating single shareholder companies has been quite popular in the Italian group of enterprises (Bellavite Pellegrini 2006 ) and has crowded completely out the competing institute of the designed estate to a specific bargain, which experienced a substantial failure of its implementation. Table 3 devotes its attention to the legal entities managing business activities belonging to the non-profit sector. This time series starts since June 30th 2006. Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network Table 3 gives evidence of a high rate of growth of associations and foundations in this period with a total increase of 56.93% which may be divided in similar rate, i.e. 57.04% for associations and 54.32% for foundations. Financial and economic crisis' s breaking up is likely to have impressed a further relevant stimulus to the rate of incorporations of non-profit legal entities, probably underlining in this way the anticyclical nature of this sector [8] . Unions, not withstand they are mainly a category of legal entities more developed in the past times, register an increase of 4.27%. typologies.
Time series of the degree of implementation of the institutes introduced by the Vietti's Reform
This paragraph is devoted to measure the degree of implementation of the different institutes introduced by the Vietti's Reform and to monitor whether do exist meaningful differences in comparison with the previously emerged trends. We take into analysis the existence of statutory provisions to issue special debt instruments (ex article 2483 of the Civil Code) by limited liability joint stock companies. We cannot verify whether these financial devices have been effectively issued, because our database does not report these data. For some extent we may however consider that a statutory provision may be a (weak) proxy of the feasible willingness of the companies to eventually issue them. Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network Table 4 shows the historical series about the implementation of the statutory provisions for issuing special debt devices. This table confirms the evidence that approximately 19% of the limited liability joint stock companies contemplate in their incorporation acts this provision. Moreover this innovation gained a clear success among the single shareholder companies, with an adoption rate of 25.12%, showing their more innovative nature in comparison with traditional companies. Whether for some extent statutory provisions could be a feasible proxy of adoption, the effective issue of these specific bonds is unknown, but anecdotal impression is supporting the idea of a very low rate of implementation.
Alternative corporate governance systems are one of the most interesting innovative institutes introduced by Vietti's Reform. Table 5 is related to the numbers of joint stock companies adopting onetier alternative corporate governance systems since their introduction. Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network
Since 2007 the stock of companies adopting a one-tier board experienced a 9.1% decrease, meanwhile the number has not registered any variation since 2009. Notwithstanding an initial interest and involvement by corporate managers and shareholders about this alternative form of corporate governance, we must register that the rate of effective adoption is extremely low, representing the 0.37% and therefore a marginal percentage of the still existing joint stock companies. Table 6 gives evidence of the stock of joint stock companies adopting a two-tier board alternative corporate governance system. Table 7 presents evidences about all the joint stock companies adopting a one tier or two tier alternative corporate governance systems. If we make an overview about alternative corporate governance systems, it could be assert that these systems are experiencing a decrease in the number of their aggregate adoption. However because of the sharper decrease of the total numbers of joint stock companies, those adopting an alternative corporate governance systems upraised of some basis point, since 0.55% in 2009 to 0.62% in 2013. As above argued the initial interest of scholars and practitioners for these innovative corporate governance systems (Bellavite Pellegrini, Pellegrini, Sironi 2010a; Bellavite Pellegrini, Pellegrini, Sironi 2010 b) did not transform in a significant degree of adoption by companies of these systems.
Coming to another point the Reform introduced the chance for unlisted joint stock companies to entrust accounting auditing to an external auditor and not to the board of auditors, without any mandatory rule. Corporate finance literature explains that unlisted joint stock companies are likely to entrust accounting auditing to an external auditor in order to more efficaciously contrast the phenomenon of earning manipulation (Baetge and Thiele 1998, Franks and Mayer 1998), mainly for venture capital or private equity companies, because executive compensations' policies necessarily rely on these accounting datasets. Table  8 presents stocks and dynamics of joint stock companies entrusting in different ways accounting auditing to the board of auditors or to an external auditor. We take now into examination the same evidence related to limited liability joint stock companies. In order to achieve this result, it is previously necessary to enumerate the number of limited liability joint stock companies which, by law [12] , do foresee the presence of a mandatory board of auditor. These evidences are presented in Table 9 . Table 10 we present the different typologies of limited liability joint stock companies and their ways of entrusting accounting monitoring to different subjects. Table 11 surveys the implementation of article 2497 of the Civil Code related to the different typologies of limited liability and joint stock companies declaring to be subject to the activity of control and coordination by another legal entity. These evidences contribute to sketch for the first time some outlines of the main economical and juridical features of the Italian phenomenon of the groups of enterprises. Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network
In the above table the numbers of companies subject to control and coordination activity by other legal entities registered a significant increase of 60%. Approximately 17.3% of the joint stock companies are subject to control and coordination, meanwhile only 2.3% of the limited liability joint stock companies do belong to some group of enterprises. Moreover more than a half (52.62%) of the various typologies of companies subject to control and coordination is composed by single shareholder companies. This consideration suggests that one of the reason of the single shareholder companies relevant success is linked with the presence of these typologies of legal entities in the companies' groups. These evidences must be composed with the further ones provided by Table  12 and Table 13 . In Table 12 we supply a comprehensive overview of the number of legal entities managing an activity of supervision and coordination on behalf of the above described companies, meanwhile Table 13 supplies more detailed information about the natures of the controlling legal entities. The number of legal entities managing activity of control and coordination increased of 69.48% since 2005, whose one third are foreign controlling legal entities. The ratio between controlling legal entities and controlled companies remains stable in time at roughly 1.6. Table 13 suggests a further step in our description, analysing the different nature of the legal entities managing activity of control and coordination. These data confirm previous evidences about the prevailing nature of joint stock and limited liability joint stock companies as legal entities controlling roughly 92% of the companies declaring to be subject to supervision and coordination, while joint stock companies represent approximately two third of these companies. Single shareholder joint stock and limited liability companies represent roughly 15% of the controlling legal entities. The residual portion of this universe (less than 10%) is composed by other typologies of legal entities ranging from individual concerns to non commercial partnerships, foundations, associations and even public or religious and moral bodies. These subjects constitute a interesting evidence because they reveal an intriguing, even if residual, side of the nature of particular legal entities at the top of the Italian Group of Enterprises.
Ownership structures
Corporations' ownerships structures have been assuming an increasing relevance among the main issues of corporate finance and corporate governance. Financial literature has devoted an almost exclusive care to the ownerships' structures of listed companies, because of their connection with the nature of agency costs. Much less attention has been dedicated to unlisted companies, mainly because of the shortage of significant samples of reliable data. However with regard to Italy the role of unlisted companies played and still plays a predominant role in the Italian corporate environment. In this section we provide these completely innovative data about ownership's structures composition of Italian unlisted companies. In Table 14 we supply evidences about the numbers of shareholders composing the capital of joint stocks and limited liability companies. From these first data it stems out the confirmation of the existence of a concentrated ownership's structure. Approximately a half of joint stock companies have no more than three shareholders and this percentage rises up to 80% for limited liability joint stock companies. For these latter if we add companies with no more than five stockholders, the percentage reaches 94.3%. For the former there are however a little more than 30% of the companies having six or more than six shareholders. According to these evidences we may suppose that only these last companies which correspond to a number of a little less than 11,000 corporations may effectively present some ingredients of complexity in their corporate governance.
In Table 15 we analyze the percentage of ownership of the first and of the first three shareholders in joint stock companies. These additional evidences do confirm the ones emerged in Table 14 . For the 53.49% companies the first shareholder owns more than 51% of the shares and if we consider the first three shareholders this percentage rises to 91.47% of the analyzed companies. Conversely the percentage of companies in which the first shareholder owns less than 33% of the capital, represent 21.42% of the companies. If we juxtapose this outcome with the previous result about the number of shareholders, we have an implicit confirm about the likelihood of the existence of some effective corporate governance issues in approximately 10,000 joint stock companies. If we implement the same procedure to limited liability joint stock companies, we find a number of companies with more than six stockholders of approximately 60,000 companies. Table 16 we propose the ownership's structure of limited liability joint stock companies, in which we notice that these latter present very similar features with the ones highlighted in joint stock companies. In approximately 50% of the limited liability companies the first shareholder holds more than 51% of the companies, meanwhile this percentage rises up to 96.59% if we consider the first three shareholders. Only in 13.86% of the companies the first shareholder holds a stake inferior to 33% of the capital, percentage which drops to less than 1% if we again take into consideration the first three shareholders. For these latter, which correspond at roughly 12,000 companies we may presume some more difficult elements of corporate governance.
Evidences about corporate deals in Italy
In this fifth section we propose new evidences about the number of different corporate deals [21] regarding joint stock and limited liability companies which occurred in Italy during 2012. Because of the innovative nature of these data we do not have any previous evidences to compare with. Table 17 highlights the evidences related to joint stock companies. Table 17 gives evidence how approximately 15% of the still existing joint stock companies experienced one sort of deals during 2012. However if we look at these data in a more detailed way, they clearly witness the progressive decline of Corporate Italy. The incorporations of new joint stock companies represent only 1.48% of the deals meanwhile the sum of discontinuities, bankruptcies and liquidation weights for 9.19%. Approximately one tenth of the Corporate Italy has put into different procedures of liquidation in just one year. Table 18 proposes similar evidence about limited liability joint stock companies. The conversion rate, presumably in limited liability joint stock companies counts for 4.2%. Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network
The percentage of limited liability joint stock companies involved in any form of deals during 2012 is 17.53% and it is quite similar to the one of joint stock companies. This typology of legal entity shows a definitely higher ratio of new incorporation (5.62%) on the total of still existing companies, but the sum of discontinuities, bankruptcies and liquidations gives evidence that roughly 10% of the still existing limited liability joint stock companies are going to expire in short term. Differently the conversion rate of these companies are definitely lower, representing the 1.16%.
Some concluding remarks
This research has pursued different targets. Firstly the historical series of stocks and dynamics of a wide range of legal entities managing economic activities and businesses in Italy since 2005 to 2013 has been properly updated. The outcomes underline the previously trends described in Bellavite Pellegrini (2006 . The number of joint stock companies is sharply decreasing; conversely the number of limited liability joint stock companies is strongly increasing. The number of partnerships slightly decreases, mainly because of the diminution of the number of general partnerships. The many coloured world of cooperatives and nonprofit organization is invested by new interests, in particular associations and foundations, even because of the financial crisis breaking up.
The third section deals with the new institutes introduced by the Reform. Some of them registered a substantial success, like single shareholder company; meanwhile others registered only a partial implementation, like the issue of special debt devices by limited liability joint stock companies or the alternative systems of corporate governance. The entrusting of accounting auditing to an external auditors for unlisted companies reveals an increasing appealing, but it is likely (Bellavite Pellegrini, Pellegrini and Sironi 2009) that the absolute majority stemmed out specific requirements by regulation. The implementation of article 2497 about the activity of supervision and coordination by different typologies of legal entities on behalf of companies has progressively revealed sizes and nature of the group of enterprises phenomenon.
Section four introduces a new issue about the ownership structures of unlisted joint stock and limited liability companies. These data strongly confirm the idea of an extremely concentrated form of ownership in Italy, being the staked owned by the first shareholders more than 51% in more than 50% both of joint stock and limited liability companies. If we consider the first three shareholders, these data rise significantly to more than 90% of the companies. According to this evidences we may therefore presume the feasible existence of a more complex corporate governance only when the first shareholder has less than 33% of the stocks or where the shareholders are six or more than six. This case occurs in a percentage ranging between 20% and 30% of the joint stock companies which approximately correspond to a number ranging between 8,000 and 11,000 corporations. Incidentally this occurs for a presumably same number of limited liability joint stock companies.
Section five proposes the second innovative issue of this research regarding the numbers of different typologies of deals concerning Italian companies. Indirectly it emerges a dramatic overview of the situation of the Corporate Italy since about 10% both of joint stock and limited liability companies have been discontinued or are going to expire in a very short period of time.
There is a nourished set for an agenda of future research in this field. In particular we recommend two different areas of further development of research's activities. The institute related with the declaration of activity of supervision and coordination by legal entities allows us to further investigate about the nature of the Italian Group of enterprises, a field in which there is shortage of reliable empirical evidences. Moreover the new databases related to the ownership structures of the joint stock and limited liability companies allow us a broader view in the corporate governance of unlisted companies. These evidences must be composed with other corporate information relating the business activities of these companies in order to have a better comprehension of their sectoral and business features and of their presumably more complex corporate governance.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Michele Vietti was the MP in charge of the bill of Reform. [2] The Monitoring Commitee of the Chamber of Commerce of Milan, headed by Cav. Bruno Ermolli to whom I express my personal thanks, made possible the implementation of this research. Many acknowledgments to Dr. Stefano Azzali and to the Professors Paolo Montalenti, Gaetano Presti and Mario Notari, who, with different tasks, helped me in the conceptual framework of this study and to Sabina Allegri and Laura Pellegrini for their support in the implementation of the datasets. [3] These datasets show as concluding date of reference March 1st 2013. [4] The data provided by these historical series come from two different sources and databases. The Italian Firms' Register which represents the first source is supposed to have expired since February 19th 1996. By no means the two databases should not theoretically be different, but in relation to this process of data storage systems, they may show some differences till 2007 that has been eliminated afterwards.
[5] The Infocamere Network recognizes five different typologies of corporations: active, not active, suspended, in liquidation and in bankruptcy. The sum of the above mentioned five categories determines the set of the "still existing" companies.
[6] For a more specific comprehension of the different marks adopted by the Infocamere Network see Bellavite Pellegrini (2006 Pellegrini ( , 2012 . [7] For a more specific comprehension of the different marks adopted by the Infocamere Network see Bellavite Pellegrini (2006 Pellegrini ( , 2012 . [8] During the crisis non-profit entities represent in some way a sort of different answer in building up economic activities.
[9] In brackets we report the percentage on the still existing joint stock companies.
[10] The evidences at this first date must be taken only in an approximate way. Two tier board companies were approximately 90 and one tier board roughly 200.
[11] In brackets we express the percentage on still existing companies.
[12] Board of Auditors in limited liability joint stock companies has a mandatory nature according to some economic thresholds of the firms, like number of employee, total assets or the amount of accounting equity.
[13] In brackets we give evidence of the percentage on the number of the still existing limited liability joint stock companies.
[14] There are not similar evidences about the mandatory or non-mandatory nature of the entrusting of the accounting auditing for limited liability joint stock companies.
[15] These are Italian legal entities whose nature is not properly classified by Infocamere Network.
[16] We have complete evidences about 83% of the still existing joint stock companies.
[17] These evidences are related to approximately 80% of the still existing joint stock companies, with the exception of the single shareholder ones.
[18] These evidences are related to the 55% of the joint stock companies, with the exception of the single shareholder ones.
[19] These data are related to the 91.74% of the still existing limited liability joint stock companies, with the exception of the single shareholder ones.
[20] These data are related to the 36.22% of the still existing limited liability joint stock companies, with the exception of the single shareholder ones.
